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Haynsworth: Professionalism in Lawyering

COMMENTS FROM THE BENCH
PROFESSIONALISM IN LAWYERING
CLEMENT

F.

HAYNSWORTH, JR.

CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Delivered May 24, 1975, to the
GraduatingClass of the Law Center
of the University of South Carolina
One important aspect of your training and capacity for leadership is the professionalism of the lawyer, and it is of that I
would like to speak to you briefly today.
This day marks the completion of your formal training for
the bar. As you know, a lawyer's training never ends and a young
lawyer matures with continuing study and experience. A lawyer
who recognizes his professionalism, therefore, will not undertake
a task for which he is ill-prepared. For instance, some of you have
had courses in securities transactions and know much about the
Securities and Exchange Act and the Trust Indenture Act. I am
confident, however, that those of you who have not had courses
in that field will not think that you are presently prepared to
handle a complicated securities issue alone. Even those of you
who have had the basic courses would be foolish to undertake
such a task without the counsel, advice and review of a more
experienced hand.
Oddly enough, however, some lawyers do not recognize this
principle when it comes to trial work. Some of you have had
courses in evidence and in trial practice, but even those of you
who have should not undertake the actual conduct of a trial alone
and unguided by a more experienced lawyer, unless you have at
least observed competent trial lawyers in action in a number of
trials. Those of you who have not had such courses or experience,
should not undertake the conduct of a trial until you have carefully prepared yourself for it. The oddity is that some lawyers do.
That lack of preparation has led to a movement in the Second
Circuit to restrict admission to the district courts in the Second
Circuit to lawyers who have prepared themselves for trial work.
Most of the law schools are strongly opposed to the movement,
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charging that it is an attempt by the federal judges in the Second
Circuit to control their curricula. I view it as no such thing. A
lawyer can prepare himself for trial work after law school, but the
law is so broad in its reach that no lawyer should think himself
prepared to do everything that lawyers as a class are called upon
to do. Many lawyers live out their lives without ever entering a
trial court or entering it only as a consultant to a trial lawyer.
Trial work is a specialty, just as handling securities transactions
is a specialty. A lawyer should feel himself no more competent
alone to handle the one than the other until he has prepared
himself adequately for it. The professional will not expose his
client to great risk of costly mistakes or inadequate representation.
Of greater moment in the professionalism of a lawyer is the
fact that he serves his clients without being their servant. He
serves to further the lawful and proper objective of the client, but
the lawyer must never forget that he is the master. He is not there
to do the client's bidding. It is for the lawyer to decide what is
morally and legally right, and, as a professional, he cannot give
in to a client's attempt to persuade him to take some other stand.
Just as a physician may not prescribe a narcotic for a patient
simply because the patient wants it, the lawyer must serve the
client's legal needs as the lawyer sees them, not as the client sees
them. During my years of practice, I never had any problem in
this respect, although some lawyers today say they do. I felt I
knew more of the law than my client did. If I didn't, they didn't
need me. So I told them what would be done and firmly rejected
suggestions that I do something else which I felt improper, wasteful and unproductive.
The professional must also take care not to present factual
and legal contentions to the courts which are calculated to mislead or to be simply unproductive. A lawyer should never seek to
lead a court into erroneous fact finding, and should be aware that
his assertion of a legal principle carries with it his own personal,
professional endorsement. He owes a duty of loyalty to his client,
but he has a higher duty as an officer of the court. We have an
adversary system, but the objective to be served is that justice be
done, and every lawyer in litigated matters has a duty to see that
the system serves the objective. That is why, as a professional
serving his client without being his client's servant, he has a duty
not to attempt to mislead a judge or to burden the courts with
frivolous or unproductive contentions. A lawyer who does not
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss4/4
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observe this principle will soon find that the judges are more deaf
than attentive when he speaks.
There is a marginal exception to the rule against misleading
or unproductive contentions, but it is an exception which need
not mar the lawyer's independent professionalism. Since Gideon'
and Argersinger,2 every person accused of a crime for which a jail
or prison sentence may be imposed is entitled to a lawyer. If he
is indigent, a lawyer must be appointed for him. The indigent
usually has no choice in the selection of the lawyer, but he is
entitled to adequate representation. One collateral consequence
of this service by lawyers is their exposure to charges of inadequate representation if the involuntary client is convicted and the
conviction is affirmed on appeal. Such exposure is particularly
threatening if the lawyer declines to let the client run the show
or to assert any contention or defense, however inappropriate,
that the client may suggest. The lawyer can handle the problem,
however, by disassociating himself from those contentions and
defenses he asserts to carry out the wishes of his clients. In my
court, lawyers are encouraged to do this simply by stating, in
effect, "At the request of my client, I make these contentions."
If there is a point which he thinks has merit, he makes it with no
qualification, and it carries with it his personal, professional endorsement. Through the use of such language, however, he withholds his personal, professional endorsement from those contentions which he thinks have no merit but which he must make
simply because his indigent client wishes him to.
Special problems arise in the involuntary relationship between lawyer and client. They can be solved, however, if the
lawyer always remembers that, although this relationship requires that he must serve his client's wishes, at least to some
extent, it is for him alone to determine to what he lends his own
personal, professional endorsement, and that it must be withheld
from the meritless.
Finally, because a lawyer is a professional serving clients
without being their servant and with a high duty to the system
for the administration of justice, the professional lawyer is concerned with the system itself and its proper functioning. The
effective functioning of the system requires the lawyer to associate himself with movements for judicial reform when it is
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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needed. Indeed, he should consider proposals for reform on their
merits and not as they may affect a special interest or particular
client. Lawyers are human, I know, and, as humans, I can understand why some lawyers, with a marked preference for federal
courts over the state courts in which they practice, oppose any
change in federal jurisdiction. I suggest to you, however, that
their professionalism is inconsistent with opposition of that sort
if founded upon the supposed interest of their particular clients.
The ALI proposals, which would narrow the diversity jurisdiction,
for instance, should receive objective consideration in the interest
of an efficient functioning of a dual system of federal and state
courts and not from the point of view of the personal interest or
preference of particular lawyers or their clients.
Law reform is a fragile thing. Small but concerted opposition
can break it if a large segment of the bar or the public is not
aroused, and the public is rarely aroused about law reform. Lawyers can supply the support to accomplish deserving change.
Their professionalism requires that they do it. My friend, Bernard
Segal, of Philadelphia, calls this the "higher calling of the lawyer
and of the bar."
The Commission on Revision of the Federal Appellate Court
System has presented a tentative report including a recommendation for the creation of a national court of appeals. Initially, it
would be a court of seven judges authorized to take and decide
cases upon referral by the Supreme Court or upon transfer by one
of the existing courts of appeals. There has long been a shortage
of appellate capacity at the highest level in this country. As the
volume of cases has swelled, as the number of problems allotted
for judicial resolution has grown and grown, the appellate capacity of the Supreme Court has remained constant. Long ago it
became inadequate for that court's performance of its assigned
role. The Supreme Court itself expressed this as long ago as 1963
in Fay v. Noia3 when it confessed itself wholly unequal to the task
of reviewing constitutional questions arising in the state courts in
prosecutions for crimes. That marked shortage of appellate capacity within the Supreme Court has long disturbed me and others. Some years ago, I advanced, in writing, a proposal for the
creation of a national court of appeals designed to meet the par3. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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ticular problems flowing from Fay v. Noia.4 In a later article, 5 I
incorporated a provision for referral by the Supreme Court to the
national court of appeals of any kind of case, but the specifics of
my proposal encountered the objection that it was too much a
specialized court, and that objection was not without some basis
in fact. Later, others proposed a greatly enlarged national court
of appeals, but their proposals, in my view, were much too amorphous and administratively impractical. Still, there was a growing recognition that something urgently need be done to supplement the appellate capacity of the Supreme Court. The lower
federal courts are much too burdened with supervision of state
courts in their resolution of federal constitutional questions, and
the burden upon the parties of processing such claims through
two parallel systems of courts is unconscionable. The Supreme
Court attempts to monitor courts of appeals of the United States
in this area, but too frequently important problems are left too
long unanswered on a national basis.
In other areas, a conflict between the circuits is a basis for
granting a writ of certiorari, but conflicts are left unresolved simply because the Supreme Court does not have the resources to do
all that should be done in the national interest. Conflicts in cases
in which the United States is a party are particularly troubling,
for a decision of a court of appeals has no nationally binding force
upon any governmental agency. Consider for a moment tax cases.
If the Commissioner loses on one contention in a court of appeals,
he is bound to treat taxpayers in that circuit consistently with the
decision of the court, but he is not required to extend such treatment to the taxpayers in other circuits. He is free to litigate the
same question elsewhere in the hope of getting a conflicting decision, and, even if he does, there may be no application to the
Supreme Court in that case or the Supreme Court may deny
review despite the conflict. The result is widely disparate treatment of taxpayers depending upon where they live. Those who
live in states served by one or two courts of appeals may receive
favorable treatment from the Commissioner which is denied to
taxpayers in all of the remaining states. This is wrong, of course,
but matters of statutory construction have a low priority in the
4. Haynsworth, A New Court to Improve the Administration of Justice, 59 A.B.A.J.
841 (1973).
5. Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the FederalAppellate
System, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 597 (1974).
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Supreme Court, where constitutional issues are pressed in great
numbers.
It is only illustratively that I have mentioned the incapacity
of the Supreme Court to review constitutional questions in state
court proceedings and tax cases. There are many other classes of
cases in which the same problems exist. A national court of appeals taking cases by referral from the Supreme Court, and some
by transfer from the present courts of appeals when a prompt
need of a national answer is recognized, would greatly relieve
these problems. Decisions of the national court of appeals would
remain subject to review by the Supreme Court, so that ultimate
control would be in the one Supreme Court for which the Constitution provides, but its resources would be effectively supplemented. Litigants, potential parties and the public at large would
no longer suffer disadvantages which result from the Supreme
Court's lack of adequate appellate capacity to perform its assigned function in the manner which was intended by the Constitution.
And so, as lawyers, as professionals, as I have said, I suggest
that it is your professional duty to consider the proposals of the
Commission on Revision and to support them, if in your personal,
professional opinion they merit support. As professionals, as officers of the courts, as those having special competence for leadership in the improvement of the courts and ultimate responsibility
for it, you are entering upon a lofty calling. On the average, you
will not make as much money as some other professionals, such
as the physicians, but so long as you serve as professionals, you
will serve your country and its people well.
You may look about you and see some lawyers who are not
performing in the professional manner I have described, but be
not the cynic. The practice of law is highly demanding, and, for
those who do it professionally, highly rewarding in terms of service of the public good and of satisfaction. If there be those who
travel the valleys in the shadows, be you resolved to tread the
bright peaks of professionalism.
Good luck and God bless you all.
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